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Abstract
Matching algorithms have been classically studied with the goal of finding stable solutions.
However, in many important societal problems, the degree of fairness in the matching assumes
crucial importance, for instance when we have to match COVID-19 patients to care units. We
study the problem of finding a stable many-to-one matching while satisfying fairness among all
the agents with cardinal utilities. We consider various fairness definitions from fair allocation
literature, such as envy-freeness (EF) and leximin optimal fairness. We find that EF and its
weaker versions are incompatible with stability, even under a restricted setting with isometric
utilities. We focus on leximin optimal fairness and show that finding such a matching is NP-
Hard, even under isometric utilities. Next, we narrow our focus onto ranked isometric utilities
and provide a characterisation for the space of stable matchings. We present a novel and efficient
algorithm that finds the leximin optimal stable matching under ranked isometric utilities. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to address the problem of finding a leximin optimally
fair and stable matching.
1 Introduction
Matchings, in particular stable matchings, have been studied for several decades, from both theo-
retical and applied perspectives [22, 41, 49, 50, 5, 55, 14, 16, 38]. Likewise, the concept of fairness
has recently been receiving intense attention, especially in social choice literature [15, 7, 8, 23, 40,
21, 18]. Several fairness notions have been studied for allocation problems, where agents have
preferences over a set of items and these items have to be allocated among the agents in a fair
manner. However, the items do not have any preferences for the agent to whom they are allocated.
In contrast, matching problems assume two groups of agents; each agent in a group has preferences
for all the agents belonging to the other group. The task is to match agents of one group to the
agents of another group. Stability and fairness are two very natural and desirable properties for
agents on both sides in matching problems.
Surprisingly, the fairness notions studied in fair allocation literature have been largely unex-
plored for matching settings. One possible reason could be the fact that the majority of fair alloca-
tion literature considers cardinal utilities whereas matchings literature almost exclusively considers
ordinal utilities. We are, thus, motivated to study a matching setting with cardinal utilities. In par-
ticular, we focus on many-to-one matchings which are widespread, ranging from the well-studied
school choice problem [2, 5] to labour markets [37, 16].
The primary motivation for our work is somewhat different from the examples prevalent in
prior work. We consider a problem that has become crucial in recent months: matching COVID-
19 patients to appropriate healthcare facilities available in a given city or region. Imagine a city
that provides universal healthcare to all its residents. In the face of a COVID-19 outbreak, they
would like to allocate their infected citizens to the available facilities. This results in a matching
problemwith infected citizens (patients) on one side and healthcare services (facilities) on the other
side. Different healthcare facilities, such as intensive care units, hospital wards, and outpatient
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consultancy, would typically be capable of different types of care facilities. On the other hand, each
patient carries a different risk factor due to their preexisting conditions and comorbidities. For
example, a young person in their 20s, presenting mild symptoms, with no other health issues is a
low risk individual. On the other hand, a person in their 80s with diabetes is a high risk individual.
We assume that there may be patients ranging from very high risk factor to very low risk factor and
we wish to provide care to all individuals.
As the city provides universal healthcare, patients do not pay for their treatment. Hence, their
utility depends entirely on how much of an improvement they see in their health and how soon it
is. In other words, a patient’s utility is a combination of their recovery rate and the magnitude of
improvement in their symptoms. Clearly, this depends on the risk factor of the patient as well as
the facility to which the patient is allocated. The lower the risk factor, the lesser will be the extent
of improvement, and thus, lower the utility. Similarly, the better the quality of care available, the
faster the patient improves. The facilities, in turn, get their funding based on the impact they have,
that is, the total utility they provide to the patients matched to them. Hence, each facility wishes
to maximize the total utility derived from treating the patients assigned to them.
We make two important observations about the example. Firstly, the utility that a patient and a
facility obtain from being matched to each other is the same. We refer to such utilities as isometric
utilities. The second is that there is a ranking over the facilities which is consistent across the
patients (for instance, for any patient, the utility from a hospital ward is greater than that from a
consultant). Furthermore, the patients can be ranked in accordance with their risk factors assuming
that the more the health risk the more utility is derived from any facility. These two observations
lead us to an interesting utility space with isometric utilities and consistent rankings. We succinctly
call these as ranked isometric utilities. Other practical settings where ranked isometric utilities
apply include recommending online ads (utility is the probability of purchase), matching student
volunteers to charities (utility is the quality of work done by the student), and school choice without
monetary considerations (utility is the score of the student on a standardised test).
Clearly, we would like these matching solutions to be stable in the sense that low-risk patients
should not be under intensive care while high-risk patients are confined to consultancy service only.
However, stability alone is not enough because it may not guarantee fairness. Sending all patients
to the same facility would preserve stability but is clearly unfair to all other facilities as they get
utility 0. One popular fairness notion is that of envy-freeness (EF) [20, 53, 48], studied in fair
allocation literature. Informally, an EF allocation guarantees that every agent would prefer its own
allocation over any other agent’s allocation. Since it is not possible to find such a solution in the
matching setting, we consider a relaxation of EF, namely, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) [15].
We show that it may not be possible to find a stable matching that satisfies EF1. We get into further
details on this in Section 4.1.
Next, we study another fairness notion called leximin optimality [11, 40] and show that it is
a relevant solution concept in the matching setting (detailed in Section 3). Informally, a leximin
optimal (fair) matching is one that maximizes the utility of the worst off agent, and out of those
matchings that achieve this, maximizes the utility of the second worst off agent, and so on. This
would essentially minimize the discrepancy in the utilities achieved by all the patients and facilities.
Taking the leximin optimal, over the utilities of all patients and facilities, ensures a balance in the
interests of both patients and facilities. We show that leximin optimality does not suffer from any
of the shortcomings that occur with envy considerations.
The majority of this paper is dedicated to finding a leximin optimal stable matching under
ranked isometric utilities. The problem of finding a leximin optimal solution for the allocation
problem is NP-Hard [11, 40]. We show in Lemma 1 that it is also NP-Hard to find a leximin optimal
stable matching under isometric utilities. However, for the subspace of matching problems with
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ranked isometric utilities, we devise a polynomial time algorithm for finding a leximin optimal
stable matching. In particular, we present an algorithm, which we call FaSt (Fair and Stable) that
outputs a leximin optimal stable matching in time O(mn) wherem is the number of facilities and n
is the number of patients. Further, we show that this algorithm finds the leximin optimal matching
in settings more general than ranked isometric utilities.
1.1 Contributions
We explore the twin objectives of stability and fairness for many-to-one matchings under cardinal
utilities. In particular, we consider the well motivated special case of isometric utilities. We first
show that a stable matching satisfying EF1 need not exist. Then, we primarily focus on leximin
optimal stable matching. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We show that finding a leximin optimal stable matching is NP-Hard under isometric utilities,
and as an obvious consequence, in more general settings as well (Section 4).
• We obtain a characterisation for the space of stable matchings in the case of ranked isometric
utilities (Section 5.1).
• We present a novel polynomial time algorithm, which we call FaSt, that finds the leximin
optimal stable matching under ranked isometric utilities (Section 5.2). On a high level, our
algorithm uses the structure on the space of stable matchings to start with a patient opti-
mal stable matching, and then iteratively improves upon the leximin value by increasing the
utilities of the facilities, while maintaining stability.
• Finally, we discuss a general space of utility functions (beyond ranked isometric utilities) for
which FaSt correctly finds the leximin optimal stable matching.
We believe we are the first to explore matching problems with ranked isometric utilities and study
the objective of finding a leximin optimal stable matching.
2 Related Work
Stable matchings and fairness have been studied almost independently for decades in social choice
literature. The formal study of the stable matching problem began with Gale and Shapley’s seminal
paper [22] where they first introduced the notion of stability. Their work initiated decades of
research on both the theory and applications of the stable matching problem [41, 50, 16, 29].
We focus on a many-to-one matching setting in bipartite graphs. Many-to-one matchings, having
immense practical relevance, have been studied from a variety of angles. Both theoretical [47,
54, 4, 32] and practical aspects [1, 19, 24, 9] of stable many-to-one matchings have been well
studied. Important applications of many-to-one matchings have initiated large bodies of work
including school choice [1, 2, 5, 46, 12], matching residents to hospitals [30, 3, 32, 27, 28] and
kidney exchange[44, 45, 13, 26]. Our work builds on this space by focusing on fairness along with
stability. While this work is inspired from the setting described in the introduction, it is relevant
across the various applications of many-to-one matchings.
2.1 Fairness Concepts in Matching Problem
Fairness is extremely desirable property for many matching scenarios. However, fairness in match-
ing settings has often been defined from context-specific angles, such as college admissions [57,
55, 39, 35]. Our work looks at fairness from a more universal angle. Some prior literature has
focused on combating the inherent bias towards the proposing side in the Gale Shapley algorithm
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[47, 31, 25, 51]. There is also some work on procedural fairness of the matching algorithms
[33, 52]. However, this literature has almost exclusively considered settings with ordinal prefer-
ences. In this paper, we consider cardinal utilities and show that it is possible to adopt various
fairness definitions from fair allocation literature, like, envy-freeness and leximin optimality.
As a slight relaxation of stability, prior work [54, 6, 56] has studied envy-free matchings, where
“envy-free” means the absence of blocking pairs. However, many-to-one matching literature often
defines stability as no blocking pairs. To avoid confusion with the fair allocation concept of envy-
freeness we define stability as the absence of blocking pairs. Moreover, our results extend well even
when there are some capacity constraints (see Section 6).
2.2 Fairness Concepts in Allocation Problem
Fair allocation refers to the problem of fairly allocating a set of items among a set of agents when
their cardinal utilities are known. The fairness notions in allocation problems, unlike matching
problems, are defined with respect to the agents only (and not the items). In this work, we adopt
these fairness notions to define two-sided fairness in the matching scenario. We now discuss some
of the popular fairness notions. One popular fairness notion is called envy-freeness (EF) [20, 53, 48],
which ensures that every agent values her allocated bundle at least as much she values the bundles
allocated to any other agent. However, an EF allocation is often not achievable when the items are
indivisible. For instance, if there is only one indivisible item, positively valued by two agents. Thus,
weaker fairness notions like envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) [15] have been studied for such
settings. When the utilities satisfy monotonicity property, an EF1 allocation always exists and can
be efficiently obtained [36]. We adopt the EF1 definition to the many-to-one matching problem and
show that there are matching instances where no solution satisfies both EF1 fairness and stability.
Another fairness notion called leximin optimality has gained attention because of mainly two
reasons: 1) it always exists and 2) whenever the marginal utilities are strictly positive, is Pareto
Optimal. The hardness of finding the leximin optimal allocation was established in [11, 40]. In
special cases, when the utilities are dichotomous (or binary) [14, 34], leximin optimality can be
achieved in polynomial time. Dichotomous preferences enable us to surpass a lot of impossibilities
as the setting is relatively restrictive. Bogomolnaia and Moulin show that the maximum weight
matching is stable under dichotomous preferences and satisfies a variety of properties including
leximin optimality. The main objective of the paper is not leximin fairness however, rather it is
simply a consequence of their other work. Recent results by Benabbou et al. [10] and Chen and
Liu [18] study the properties of a leximin optimal allocation for restricted settings. Of course, it
must be taken into account that properties and algorithms that hold in allocation settings do not
necessarily hold in matching settings. Hence, the existing algorithms cannot be used as is. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider leximin optimality for the matching problem,
without restricting to dichotomous valuations.
3 Preliminaries and Main Results
We now setup our model and give the necessary definitions in order to state our main results.
3.1 Definitions and Notations
Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} be a non-empty, finite, and ordered set of patients and F = {f1, . . . , fm} be a
non-empty, finite, and ordered set of facilities. We assume that there are at least as many patients
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as facilities, that is, n ≥ m. Note that, when n < m, the best we can do is match the patients to
facilities as in a maximum weight matching.
Let ua(·) be the utility function of agent a, a ∈ P ∪F . We assume that the utilities are additive,
in that the utility of a facility is the sum of its utilities for each of its matched patients. Thus,
each isometric utilities instance can be uniquely identified by the tuple I = 〈P,F , V 〉. Here V is an
n×mmatrix where vij is the utility of pi for matching with fj, or vij = upi(fj) = ufj (pi). Whenever
we speak of rankings or ranked isometric utilities we shall assume that upi(f1) > upi(f2) > · · · >
upi(fm) for all i ∈ [n] and ufj (p1) > ufj(p2) > · · · > ufj (pn) for all j ∈ [m]. Hence, each row and
column of the matrix V are sorted in decreasing order.
The goal is to find a many-to-one matching µ of the bipartite graph G = (P,F ,P × F) such
that µ satisfies stability as well as fairness properties. A matching µ ⊆ P × F is a subset of the
edge set such that each patient has at most one incident edge present in the matching, whereas a
facility may have multiple incident edges. Alternatively, µ can be defined as a function that maps
an element to a set of elements, µ : P ∪ F 7→ 2P∪F such that for each element pi ∈ P, the function
satisfies µ(pi) ∈ F and |µ(pi)| = 1, and for each element fj ∈ F , the function satisfies µ(fj) ⊆ P
and |µ(fj)| ≥ 0 s.t. for each i ∈ [n], pi ∈ µ(µ(pi)) and for each j ∈ [m], fj = µ(p) for all p ∈ µ(fj).
The utility of an element under a matching µ is defined as
ua(µ) =
∑
b∈µ(a)
ua(b). (1)
Next, we define two desirable properties of a matching, namely, stability and leximin optimality.
Definition 1 (Stable Matching). A matching µ of instance I = 〈P,F , V 〉is said to be stable if there
does not exist a blocking pair (pi, fj).
Definition 2 (Blocking Pair). Given a matching µ, a tuple (pi, fj) is called a blocking pair if pi /∈
µ(fj) and there exists i
′ ∈ µ(fj) such that vij > vi′j and vij > upi(µ). That is, there should be no
(patient, facility) pair s.t. they prefer to be matched to each other than to be matched as in µ.
We denote the space of stable matchings1 which do not leave any agent unmatched as SC(I).
Our work is focused on finding a leximin optimal matching. The leximin tuple of any matching
is simply the tuple containing the utilities of all the agents under this matching listed in non-
decreasing order. Note that the position of a particular agent’s utility in the leximin tuple may
change under different matchings. The leximin tuple of a matching µ will be denoted by Lµ
Definition 3 (Leximin Superior). We say that matching µ1 is leximin superior to µ2 if there exists
a valid index k such that Lµ1 [k
′] = Lµ2 [k
′] for all k′ < k and Lµ1 [k] > Lµ2 [k].
We shall say that the leximin value of µ1 is greater than that of µ2 if µ1 is leximin superior to µ2.
Definition 4 (Leximin Optimal). A leximin optimal matching µ∗ is the matching that is leximin
superior to all other possible matchings. In other words, µ∗ maximizes the utility of the worst-off
agent, among those that do this, maximizes the utility of the second worst-off agent and so on.
Essentially, we wish to find the matching that maximizes the left most value in the leximin tuple,
of those that do, find the one that maximizes the second value and so on. In general, this problem
is NP-Hard. Our goal is to find a leximin optimal matching over the space of stable matchings.
1Note that our definition of stability does not assume or imply any minimum/maximum capacity on the number of
patients matched to a facility unlike in [22, 42].
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3.2 Main Results
The main focus of this paper is to find a fair and stable many-to-one matching. We first show that
envy and stability are not always compatible. As a result, we turn to leximin optimality over the
space of stable matchings. To this end, we study an interesting class of many-to-one matching
instances called isometric utilities. This setting has a large number of practical applications, well
beyond matching patients to facilities setting. The fact that the utilities are isometric does not
restrict the agents from having heterogeneous preference ordering over the agents on the other
side. We use this to establish the hardness of finding the leximin optimal stable matching under
isometric utilities, by a reduction from the balanced partition problem.
Lemma 1. A set of integers S = {s1, . . . , sk} such that
k∑
i=1
si = 2B admits a balanced partition if
and only if the leximin optimal stable matching of the instance 〈P = S,F = {f1, f2}, V 〉 allocates
utility of B to both f1 and f2.
Consequently, if we wish to ensure that computation of the leximin optimiser is efficient, we would
like to ensure that we have some structure over the space of stable matchings which we might hope
to iterate over. Subsequently, we study matching instances under identical rankings where we do
find structure.
Lemma 2. Given an instance of ranked isometric utilities, a matching µ is stable if and only if, for
all j ∈ [m], µ(fj) = {phj+1, · · · , phj+kj} where kj = |µ(fj)| and hj =
∑j−1
t=1 kt.
Lemma 2 ensures that a stable solution for a ranked isometric instance would necessarily allocate
contiguous patientsto each fj. We exploit this structure in the algorithm, FaSt (Algorithm 2). We
establish the correctness of our algorithm in the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 1. FaSt (Algorithm 2) finds a leximin optimal and stable matching for ranked isometric
utilities in time O(mn).
Further, in Section 6, we list various spaces of utility functions where this algorithm can be
extended. Before we prove the algorithmic results, we first demonstrate some hurdles to achieving
fairness and stability in the isometric utilities space.
4 Impediments to Fairness in the Stable Matching Problem
Before we begin our discussion on leximin, let us first motivate the need for leximin optimality over
the space of stable matchings. In particular, we show that envy, a well-defined and popular fairness
notion, may not be compatible with stability, even under ranked isometric utilities.
4.1 Envy and Stability Don’t Mix
Often the first fairness notion that comes to mind when we think of fair allocations is envy-
freeness(EF). Envy-free allocations or matchings are those where no agent has a strictly higher
utility for another agent’s allocation than they have for their own. Clearly, EF allocations/matchings
need not exist in indivisible settings. Consider P = {p1, p2} and F = {f1, f2} with utilities v11 = 10,
v12 = 5, v21 = 8, and v22 = 2. Let µ be a matching such that µ(p1) = f1 and µ(p2) = f2. Since
up2(f1) > up2(f2), the agent p2 envies p1, similarly, agent f2 envies f1. It is easy to see that in every
possible matching µ, there will always be at least one agent who will envy the other agent.
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Envy-freeness upto one item (EF1) is a popular notion of fairness for allocations of indivisible items.
An allocation A = (A1, · · · , An) is said to be EF1 if for every distinct pair of agents i and j, there
exists g ∈ Aj such that ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj\{g}). An allocation is envy-free up to any good (EFX) if for
all g ∈ Aj , ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj\{g}). In one-to-one matchings, EF1 and EFX are achieved trivially.
In the case of many-to-one matchings, finding EF1 matchings, in particular, matchings that
are EF1 for the facilities, can be done by using a round robin procedure [17, 7]. However, such
a matching need not be stable, even under ranked isometric utilities. In fact, there exist ranked
isometric utilities instances where no matching simultaneously satisfies stability and EF1. Consider
the following example: let n = 4 and m = 2. The utility matrix is as in Table 1.
Patient f1 f2
p1 100 10
p2 99 9
p3 20 4
p4 19 3
Table 1: Utility Matrix
f1 f2 EP EF Etotal
1-4 - 0 26 26
1-3 4 16 20 36
1,2 3,4 32 12 44
1 2-4 120 38 158
- 1-4 0 238 238
Table 2: Stable Matching Space
A counterexample for Envy and Stability
Now it is easy to verify that the only EF1 matching is µ = {(p1, f1), (p2, f2), (p3, f1), (p4, f2)}. This
however is not stable as (p2, f1) form a blocking pair. Hence, when stability is non-negotiable, EF1
cannot be the fairness notion of choice for isometric utilities. Consequently, neither can EFX.
It has been shown that the space of stable matchings of any given instance can be captured as
the extreme points of a linear polytope [43, 49]. Thus, we can optimize any linear function over
this space. Consequently, our next idea may be to look for a stable matching that minimizes average
envy, or equivalently, total envy. But that too can often lead to matchings that are inherently unfair.
Consider the example given in Table 1. The stable matchings in this example and the envy they
induce is as in Table 2.
Clearly, in this example, matching all the patients to f1 reduces the total/average envy but this
is obviously unfair to f2. This is happening despite the fact that there are more patients than there
are facilities. Note that in this example, there is in fact a ranking and yet envy doesn’t work well.
In order to avoid such outcomes, we study leximin optimal fairness.
4.2 Hardness of Leximin Optimality in No-Rank Settings
While envy is not a feasible fairness notion for many-to-one matchings, leximin avoids all the down-
falls of envy. It is guaranteed to exist, and it ensures that each facility will be matched to at least
one patient. In some sense, it aims to bridge the disparity between the agent with the lowest utility
and one with the highest. Despite its many merits, leximin too has its disadvantages, namely its
intractability, even under isometric utilities. We now state our first main result, the computational
hardness of finding a leximin optimal stable matching under isometric utilities. We show a reduc-
tion from the partition problem to the current problem.
Partition Problem: Given a set of integers S = {s1, . . . , sk}, such that
∑k
i=1 si = 2B, find a 2-
partition {A1, A2} of S which satisfies
∑
si∈A1
si =
∑
si∈A2
si = B.
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Given an instance of the partition problem S, we create a matchings instance as follows. Setm = 2,
n = k and set ui1 = ui2 = si. In such a setting it is easy to see that all matchings are stable as no
patient has any incentive to deviate.
Lemma 1. A set of integers S = {s1, . . . , sk} such that
k∑
i=1
si = 2B admits a balanced partition if
and only if the leximin optimal stable matching of the instance 〈P = S,F = {f1, f2}, V 〉 allocates
utility of B to both f1 and f2.
Proof. In any matching, patients will always get the same value, that is patient pi always gets value
si. Thus for a leximin optimal matching, it suffices to check the values that the facilities attain.
Let S admit a balanced partition {A1, A2}. Let µ be the matching which matches f1 to all the
patients whose values are in A1 and matches f2 to the rest. Here, clearly, both facilities get value
B. The leximin tuple of µ will list the si values first, in non-decreasing order and the last two
entries will both be B. Any matching that gives any one of the facilities, say f1, higher utility, will
naturally decrease the utility of the other facility, f2. Hence f2’s value will either be lower in the
same position in the leximin tuple, or be to the left, resulting in a lower leximin value in both cases.
Hence, µ is a leximin optimal matching.
Conversely, if the leximin optimal matching gives value B to both f1 and f2 then the partition
created by the matching is clearly balanced.
Note that the reduction actually reduces the partition problem to a setting where there are rankings,
but ties are permitted. This discourages us from looking at settings other than those with strict
rankings over the two partitions.
5 Leximin for Ranked Isometric Utilities
In view of the hardness of finding the leximin optimal matching under isometric utilities without
any further restrictions, we now focus on a class of matching instances, called ranked isometric
utilities. Ranked isometric utilities are settings where all the patients have the same strict preference
order over the facilities and vice-versa. We now characterise the space of stable matchings for any
matching problem with ranked isometric utilities.
5.1 Characterizing a Stable Matching
Recall that the agents are numbered in decreasing order of the utilities they induce (i.e., according
to their ranks). That is upi(f1) > · · · > upi(fm) and ufj(p1) > · · · > ufj (pn). This ranking gives
structure to the space of stable matchings. We find that for a matching to be stable, it must be in
accordance with the rankings.
Lemma 2. Given an instance of ranked isometric utilities, a matching µ is stable if and only if, for
all j ∈ [m], µ(fj) = {phj+1, · · · , phj+kj} where kj = |µ(fj)| and hj =
∑j−1
t=1 kt.
Proof. We prove the forward implication by assuming µ to be a stable matching that matches each
facility fj to kj patients. We inductively prove that the required property holds. We first show that
µ(f1) is the set of first k1 > 0 patients
2, that is, p1, · · · , pk1 . Suppose not, then there exists some
i ∈ [k1] such that pi /∈ µ(f1) and that µ(pi) = fj for some j > 1. Consequently, there must be an
2We can assume without lose of generality that k1 > 0.
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i′ > k1 such that pi′ ∈ µ(f1). However, upi(f1) > upi(fj) and uf1(pi) > uf1(pi′), by assumption.
Thus, (pi, f1) form a blocking pair, which contradicts the fact that µ is a stable matching. We now
assume that, for the stable matching µ, the lemma holds for the first t − 1 facilities, t ≥ 2 i.e.,
µ(fj) = {phj+1, · · · , phj+kj} where hj =
∑j−1
j′=1 kj′ for all j < t.
We now show that the lemma is true for ft. Suppose not, then there exists i such that ht < i ≤
ht+kt and pi /∈ µ(ft). This implies that, there must exist some i
′ > ht+kt such that pi′ ∈ µ(ft). Let
µ(pi) = fj, j > t. Now, as the instances are ranked, upi(ft) > upi(fj) and uft(pi) > uft(pi′). This
implies that (pi, ft) form a blocking pair which contradicts the stability of µ.
This proves that if µ is a stable matching that matches fj to kj patients, then µ(fj) must be
equal to {phj+1, · · · , phj+kj}.
We now prove the reverse implication. Let µ be a matching which matches fj to kj patients and
µ(fj) = {phj+1, · · · , phj+kj} where hj =
∑j−1
j′=1 kj′ for all j ∈ [m].
Fix i ∈ [n], and let µ(pi) = fj . If j = 1, pi clearly does not form a blocking pair with any facility.
If j > 1, then Ai prefers f1, · · · , fj−1 to fj. But, all these facilities prefer each of the patients
matched to them to pi, because of the ranking. Consequently, pi does not form any blocking pairs.
As a result, there are no blocking pairs in µ and it is a stable matching.
Note that the number of stable matchings under ranked instances is thus
(
n+1
m−1
)
. Nonetheless, this
seemingly simple fact provides a structure over the leximin values of stable matchings under ranked
isometric utilities. Consequently, it enables us to find the leximin optimal stable matching. We now
list some observations about the structure of a leximin optimal stable matching µ∗ over the set of
stable matchings under ranked isometric utilities.
Observation 1. A leximin optimal stable matching matches each facility to at least one patient, i.e.
µ∗(fj) 6= ∅ for all j ∈ [m].
Observation 2. The top-ranked patient is always matched to the top-ranked facility, and the least-
ranked patient is matched to the least-ranked facility. That is, p1 ∈ µ
∗(f1) and pn ∈ µ
∗(fm).
Observation 3. If pi is matched to fj then pi−1 must be matched to either fj or fj−1. That is,
pi ∈ µ
∗(fj) ⇒ pi−1 ∈
(
µ∗(fj) ∪ µ
∗(fj−1)
)
.
Observation 4. For any stable matching µ, under ranked isometric utilities, the utilities of the
patients will appear in accordance with their rank in the leximin tuple, that is, for any i < i′,
upi′ (µ) < upi(µ), for all µ ∈ SC(I).
Observation 5. For any matching µ under isometric utilities, the utility of a facility will always be
greater than or equal to the utility of any patient matched to it. That is, ufj (µ) ≥ upi(µ) for each
facility fj and for all pi ∈ µ(fj).
Note that Observations 1, 2 and 3 do not rely on the isometric utilities property and will hold for
all ranked instances with positive utilities. These observations are critical for the design of the
algorithm and its proof of correctness in Theorem 1, which states that FaSt (Algorithm 2) outputs
a leximin optimal fair and stable matching under ranked isometric utilities.
5.2 FaSt: An Algorithm to find a Fair and Stable Matching
In this section, we present an O(mn) time algorithm, called FaSt, to find a leximin optimal (fair)
and stable matching under ranked isometric utilities. The algorithm starts with a stable matching
and gradually finds leximin optimal matching by improving the utilities of the facilities according to
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lexicographic order one-by-one, keeping stability and non-zero utilities for all agents as an invariant
in each update. By Observation 3 and 5 we can start with patient pn and iteratively decide the
matchings for higher ranked patients.
The initial stable solution matches patient pn to facility fm and patient p1 to facility f1 (using
Observation 2). Moreover, the first n −m+ 1 patients are matched to f1, whereas each of the last
m− 1 patients are matched to the last m− 1 facilities, i.e., µ(fj) = pn−(m−j) for each j ≥ 2.
After the initialization, the algorithm systematically increases the number of patients matched
to the lowest ranked facility fm. A patient pi is added to µ(fm) if vim > ufm({pi+1, . . . , pn}).
To increase the number of patients matched to facility, the procedure Demote (Algorithm 1) is
used, which also ensures that each facility is matched to at least one patient. We describe this
subsequently. In the unlikely event when vim == ufm({pi+1, . . . , pn}), a carefully designed look-
ahead condition decides whether to include pi to fm or to stop adding anymore patients to fm. Note
that increasing the set µ(fm) results in decrease of utilities of the patients matched to fm (since
these patients are demoted from higher ranked facilities). Our algorithm balances the utilities of
patients and facilities by ensuring that whenever vim < ufm({pi+1, . . . , pn}) for some pi, no further
patients are matched to fm. In other words, since assigning pi to fm would decrease the utility of
pi by a large amount, the algorithm would not assign pi to fm. At that point, the matching to the
facility fm is fixed. We shall say that the matching of a patient pi (or a facility fj) is fixed if and only
if they are matched as in a leximin optimal stable matching.
After fm is fixed, the process (of increasing the number matched patients) is repeated for fm−1,
fm−2, and so on. The algorithm stops when one of the two happens: either the bottom m − 1
facilities f2, · · · , fm get fixed, or the f1 is matched to top-ranked patient p1 only. Note that, every
time a patient is demoted, no patient sees an increase in their utility and no facility sees a decrease
in their utility. As a result, whenever a patient is demoted, their position in the leximin represen-
tation either moves to the left or stays in the same position, and the position of the corresponding
facility moves to the right. Since, the utilities of the previously matched patients are unaffected,
due to Observation 4 their positions stay the same. Hence, the algorithm optimizes for one leximin
position at a time, before moving on to the next one.
Demote (Algorithm 1) is critical to maintaining the invariant of a stable matching where all
agents have non-zero utility. If we decide to send patient pi to facility fj when they are currently
matched to fj−1, it is not enough to simply do this one step. Doing this alone will make fj−1’s
utility 0 which violates our invariant. As a result, we need to bring the patient pi−1 and match her
to fj−1, this must continue till we send f1’s lowest ranked patient to f2. For this to be feasible,
f1 must be matched to at least 2 patients. If not, no transfers are possible and as a result, no
further improvement can be made to the leximin tuple. We ensure this feasibility in the while loop
condition in Step 7 of FaSt.
Algorithm 1: Demote
Input: A matching µ, index of a patient i, and index of a facility j.
Output: µ
1 Set t← i;
2 Set p← j;
3 while p ≥2 do
4 µ(fd−1) ← µ(fd−1)\{pt};
5 µ(fd) ← µ(fd) ∪ {pt};
6 t← t− 1;
7 p← p− 1;
8 end
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Algorithm 2: FaSt
Input: Instance of ranked isometric utilities 〈P ,F , V 〉
Output: µ
1 Initiate a stable matching: µ(f1)← {p1, · · · , pn−m+1} and µ(fj)← {pn−(m−j)} for j ≥ 2;
2 Initialize i← n− 1, j ← m ;
3 Set L as the leximin tuple for µ;
4 Set pos[i] as the position of pi in L, i ∈ [n];
5 \\tie breaking leximin position: when the utility attained by a patient is same as that of one or more
facilities, the source of the left most entry will be the patient, and the sources for the others will be
the facilities in increasing order of their ranks.
6 Initialize Φ← {pn}; \\ stores the agents whose matching is fixed.
7 while i > j − 1 AND j > 1 do
8 if ufj (µ) ≥ vi(j−1) then
9 j ← j − 1;
10 else
11 if [vij > ufj (µ)] then
12 µ← Demote(µ, i, j);
13 else
14 if vij < ufj (µ) then
15 j ← j − 1;
16 else
17 \\Tie-breaking routine: Need to check if sending pi to fj will improve the leximin
value ;
18 k ← i− 1;
19 t← pos[i];
20 µ′ ← Demote(µ, i, j);
21 while k > j − 1 do
22 if ukj > L[t] then
23 µ← Demote(µ′, k, j);
24 i← k;
25 break;
26 else
27 if vij < ufj (µ) then
28 j ← j − 1;
29 break;
30 else
31 \\We have another tie and send pk to fj tentatively;
32 µ′ ← Demote(µ′, k, j);
33 k ← k − 1, and t← t+ 1;
34 end
35 end
36 end
37 if k = j − 1 AND µ 6= µ′ then
38 j ← j − 1;
39 end
40 end
41 end
42 end
43 Φ← {pi, · · · , pn} ∪ {fj+1, · · · fm};
44 Update(L, µ, pos);
45 i← i− 1;
46 end
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Theorem 1. FaSt (Algorithm 2) finds a leximin optimal and stable matching for ranked isometric
utilities in time O(mn).
Proof. We first prove that the algorithm always computes a leximin optimal stable matching.
Correctness: During initialization, FaSt matches pn to fm, and fixes the match by assigning pn
to the set Φ. This step indicates that pn remains matched to fm throughout the execution of the
algorithm. Recall that, by Observation 4 listed in Section 5.1, for the optimal stable matching µ∗,
the first entry in its leximin representation L(µ∗) is vnm = upn(fm), which is ensured by FaSt.
We shall say that the matching of a patient pi (or a facility fj) is fixed if and only if the corre-
sponding matching is a part of a leximin optimal matching. Let the matchings of pt+1, · · · , pn be
fixed, t ≤ n− 1 and let pt+1 be matched to fd. Hence, the matchings of fd+1, · · · , fm are also fixed.
By Observation 4, f1, · · · , fd and p1, · · · , pt−1 must occur to the right of pt in the leximin tuple
of any stable matching, in particular the leximin optimal one. Similarly, pt+1, · · · , pn must be listed
to the left of pt. This will not change, irrespective of the way the other agents are matched, as long
as stability is maintained. Also, since pt’s utility for fd does not depend on how any other agent is
matched, it will not change once it is fixed. As a result, µ∗ matches pt to fd if and only if it results
in a leximin superior matching.
By sending pt to fd, pt now moves to the left of its current position in the leximin tuple. For an
improvement in the leximin tuple, it shouldn’t move more than one position, and its value at the
new position should not be lower than the current value. Thus, if vt(d−1) is less than or equal to
fd’s current utility, pt must be fixed to fd−1, the matching of fd must be matched as in the current
matching. Note that, adding more patientsto fd’s matching will continue to have pt at the same
position, due to Lemma 2 and as a result will remain leximin inferior to the current matching.
By the same reasoning, if vtd is strictly lower than fd’s current utility, pt must be fixed to fd−1,
the matching of fd must be matched as in the current matching. On the other hand if vtd is strictly
greater than fd’s current utility, pt must be fixed to fd.
In the case where these two values are equal, we must look ahead to see whether by demoting
pt we eventually result in a leximin inferior matching. Note that simply comparing fd’s new utility
need not suffice. By demoting pt we may land in a setting where fd’s new utility lies between vtd
and v(t−1)(d−1), resulting in a matching which is leximin inferior to the current one. However by
sending pt−1 to fd we may actually improve upon the current leximin tuple. Let the position of pt
when matched to fd be k. Thus, we must look ahead, comparing the new leximin values (obtained
by sending pt+1 to fd) at position k + 1 with the current leximin value at position k + 1. If the
values are equal we may have to look ahead further and accordingly fix the matching. Thus, when
the matchings of pt+1 and pn are fixed we can correctly match pt as in a leximin optimal matching.
It is straightforward to see that the algorithm takes O(mn) time to terminate, which is linear in the
number of edges of the underlying bipartite graph. We provide a proof for completeness.
Termination: The algorithm considers each patient for a particular facility at most once. Hence,
the algorithm concludes in O(mn) time. Note that, in the absence of ties, each patient is considered
for at most 2 facilities, thus taking O(n) time only. However, if ties occur, the tie breaking routine
can take time O(n) for each facility. The update to the leximin tuple L and the array pos can be
done in time O(n+m) = O(n) as well. Thus, the algorithm takes O(mn) time in the worst case.
6 Extending to Other Settings
While the proofs and discussions thus far have focused on many-to-one matchings under isometric
utilities, with no constraints on the capacities, the approach behind FaSt can correctly find the
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leximin optimal in a variety of other settings. We now discuss some of these.
6.1 Capacity Constraints
The majority of prior work on many-to-one matchings assumes that each facility has a maximum
capacity or budget on the number of patients it can accommodate. In such settings, stability is
defined as the absence of any blocking pairs, with the additional constraint that no patient prefers
some other facility (which has not reached its capacity) over their current match. The proof of
computational hardness of finding leximin stable matching (in Section 4) holds true even with
capacities—by setting the capacity of both facilities in the example as n. However, under rankings,
adding a capacity aspect to the definition of stability will give exactly one stable matching in each
instance. This will be precisely the matching which matches f1 to the top c1 patients and B2 to
pc1+1, · · · , pc1+c2 and so on, where cj is the capacity of fj.
Alternately, one may wish to continue to define stability only as the absence of blocking pairs,
without capacity considerations. In such a case, a simple tweak to FaSt suffices. In the very first if
condition (Step 8 of Algorithm 2), we need to also check if |µ(fj)| is at its given capacity. Recall
that this is the condition which checks if the current utility of fj is already greater than or equal
to pi’s current utility. It is simple to see that this will correctly find the leximin optimal stable
matching, given that all facilities have capacity at least 1 (similar to the proof of Theorem 1). Note
that facilities that have capacity 0 can be discarded at the outset. Thus, the same approach can
be used to find the leximin optimizer under ranked isometric utilities over the space of matchings
which have no blocking pairs.
6.2 Beyond Isometric Utilities
FaSt proceeds by increasing the number of patients allotted to the lowest ranked unfixed facility
till there is a decrease in the leximin value. The success of this approach is contingent on 1) the
inherent rankings 2) utility functions of the facilities being monotone increasing3, and 3) the five
observations listed in Section 5.1. We do not rely directly on the fact that the utilities are isometric.
Further, whenever we have these three requirements met in a matchings instance, we can use FaSt
as is to find the leximin optimal stable matching. Essentially, FaSt works correctly for the space
of monotone increasing utility functions with rankings where upi(fj) ≤ ufj(pi) and for all i ∈ and
j ∈ [m].
Rankings give the space of stable matchings some structure over which we are able to iterate.
Consequently, rankings are essential to the success of our algorithm. We don’t expect that in the
absence of some structure we will be able to find a leximin optimal stable matching efficiently. FaSt
does not work for instances with rankings for which Observation 5 does not hold. However the
underlying approach works when the number of facilities is exactly 2. Recall that the approach was
to start with a matching which will match only pn to f2 all the rest to f1. We then keep increasing
the number of students matched to B2 till we see a decrease in the leximin value.
Consider a setting where when upi(fj) = αiufj(pi) where 1 ≤ αn ≤ · · · ≤ α1. When m = 2 all
the patients must be divided between the two facilities such that moving a patient from either one
to the other will decrease the leximin value. Due to the structure of the stable matchings under
rankings (Lemma 2 applies here) if a patient pi cannot be matched with f2 then no patient ranked
higher can be matched with f2. A decrease in the leximin value could happen in one of two ways:
either f1’s utility is already lower than f2’s so removing any further patients will only cause the
3that is, for all i ∈ [n], P ⊆ P\{pi}, we have that ufj (P ) ≤ ufj (P ∪ {pi}), for each j ∈ [m]
13
leximin value to decrease further. Otherwise, the utility of f2 is already greater than that of the
patient ranked just above the highest patient matched to f2. As a result, matching that patient to
f2 would decrease the leximin value. Note that when αn is so large that upn(µ) > u(f1)(µ), for all
complete matchings µ, finding the leximin optimal essentially reduces to finding a leximin optimal
allocation under constraints. An algorithm which efficiently finds a leximin optimal matching for
when αn > 1, would imply that the corresponding leximin optimal allocation under constraints can
be found in polynomial time.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
This work considers the problem of finding a fair and stable many-to-one matching under cardinal
utilities. We study a notion of fairness which is guaranteed to exist: a leximin optimizer, which
has been hitherto unexplored for stable matchings. We show that finding a leximin optimal stable
matching is NP-Hard for the space of isometric utilities. However, when there is an inherent ranking
over agents on both sides, we provide an algorithm, called FaSt, that finds a leximin optimal stable
matching in time linear in the number of edges (of the underlying bipartite graph). Our algorithm,
however, is applicable beyond ranked isometric utilities.
The key reason that we are able to efficiently compute the leximin optimal stable matching is the
underlying structure on the space of stable matchings under rankings, this characterisation is also
a non-trivial contribution of this work. An immediate follow up would be to resolve this question
for the general space of ranked (non-isometric) utilities. We believe that this work will encourage
further research on fair and stable matchings under cardinal utilities, with different definitions of
fairnes and various subclasses of many-to-one matching problems.
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